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The present study on “Dynamics of the Mongolian macroeconomics in the last three years (III 
quarter of 2006-III quarter of 2009)” was implemented in the frame of work on development 
of “A short- and mid-term macroeconomic computer model of Mongolia” on commission of 
the Open Society Forum of Mongolia in the course of the study to determine interdependence 
and correlation of variables and parameters. 
The study used all issues of the monthly bulletin published by the National Statistics Committee 
from the first half of 2006 to the third quarter of 2007.
51. SPECIAL OCCASION OF 2006 
In 2006 the Mongolian economy for the first 
time in the last fifty years showed a balance and 
DYNAMICS OF MONGOLIAN MACROECONOMICS IN THE 
LAST THREE YEARS
Table 1
No Indicators 2006
NN 1 2
1 GDP growth (compared to the previous year) % +8.6
2 Inflation rate % +6.0
3 Foreign trade balance
- Million US dollars +57.2 
- Share in export +3.7
4 Share of budget expenditure in GDP -% 36.5
5 Budget balance
- Million MNT +6.3
- Share in income +0.4
6 Ratio of total money to GDP 41.3
7 Currency rate (1 US dollar = tugrug) 
     Changes – MNT -56.0
     Percentage of changes -4.6
8 Changes in the percentage of non-performing loans in total loans - % -0.76
9 Percentage of total loans outstanding in total money - % 79.6
10. Ratio of bank reserves to total  loans outstanding- % 15.5
Less government reserves 6.3
positive dynamics of macroeconomic indicators. 
These specifics are shown in table 1.
The above indicators illustrate that in 2006 the national 
economy reached a favorable balance and obtained 
an ability to maintain its stable dynamics under good 
regulation. 
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No                   Indicators First half of 2009
NN 1 2
1 GDP growth (compared to the previous year) % -5.5
2 Inflation rate % +7.3%
3 Foreign trade balance
- Million US dollars -131.9
- Share in export -17.3
4 Share of budget expenditure in GDP -% 58.6
5 Budget balance
- Million MNT -261.3
- Share in income -31.6
6 Ratio of total money to GDP - % 39.2
7 Currency rate (1 US dollar = tugrug) 
                  Changes – MNT 1435
                  Percentage of changes +24.0
8 Percentage of non-performing loans in total loans outstanding - % 11.6
9 Percentage of total loans outstanding in total money  - % 105.5
10. Ratio of bank reserves to total loans outstanding - %         18.2
11. Ratio of bank reserves less government savings to total loans 
outstanding - %
-2.9
2. 2009 CRISIS OUTLOOK
In three years since 2006 the main economic 
indicators of our country have declined sharply 
and lost their positive balance and dynamics. Table 
2 shows them in the first half of year 2009.  
The above indicators illustrate that the national 
economy lost its balance and plunged into acute 
crisis.
7The economic recession that became obvious 
in the second half of 2008 and reached its peak 
in the first half of 2009 is commonly explained 
in relation to the global financial and economic 
crisis. It not only produces an understanding that 
Mongolian economy is dependent on external non-
resolvable forces, but also raises expectations that 
the present recession will somehow be resolved as 
the global crisis recedes. 
How justified is this concept can be only proved 
or rejected by research based on objective statistics 
and other materials.
To do this, dynamics of main economic indicators 
and parameters should be analyzed by quarters and 
half years.
3.1. General index of prices for consumer goods
3. MACROECONOMIC CHANGES IN 2006-2009
Table 3
Time (year, quarter)
Index compared to the 
end of 2006 
 Index compared to the 
previous quarter
1 2 3
2007 îí I quarter 1.022 1.022
II quarter 1.064 1.041
III quarter 1.126 1.058
IV quarter 1.151 1.022
2008 îí I quarter 1.247 1.083
II quarter 1.376 1.104
III quarter 1.434 1.041
IV quarter 1.405 0.987
2009 îí I quarter 1.450 1.032
II quarter 1.385 0.955
Fluctuations of prices for consumer goods are the 
most sensitive indicators of the general economic 
situation and market balance. Table 3 shows price 
indices for 2006-2009.
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2006 îí 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
2007 I quarter 
II quarter 
III quarter 
IV quarter 
1.022
1.064
1.126
1.151
1.010
1.039
1.186
1.246
99.8
100.1
102.5
103.0
0.999
1.002
1.056
1.113
1.000
1.004
1.115
1.142
0.988
1.022
1.062
1.106
1.000
1.000
1.202
1.202
1.035
1.046
1.126
1.140
2008 I quarter 
II quarter 
III quarter 
IV quarter 
1.247
1.376
1.434
1.405
1.450
1.721
1.625
1.545
104.7
1.108
1.138
1.200
1.125
1.154
1.361
1.367
1.191
1.383
1.442
1.450
1.152
1.181
1.508
1.391
1.202
1.202
1.682
1.682
1.192
1.332
1.465
1.498
2009 I quarter 
II quarter
1.450
1.385
1.649
1.587
1.219
1.204
1.329
1.376
1.483
1.453
1.361
1.393
1.682
1.682
1.529
1.507
It shows that:
1. Regulation of the annual inflation rate 
maintained at one-digit figure was lost since  
2nd to 3d quarters of 2007 and the speed of 
price growth reached its peak in the third 
quarter of 2008.
2. In the course of last ten quarters the highest 
growth of consumer prices was observed in the 
second quarter of 2008.
3. A trend of declining speed of price growth 
in the last quarter of the year was repeatedly 
observed each year. 
Causes of such dynamics of changes in prices 
are well-known. If in second and third quarters 
of 2007 prices rose following sharp increase in 
salaries of budget organizations, in the second 
and third quarters of 2008 expectations of money 
promised by political parties during parliament 
elections led to sharp growth of prices.
Trends and the speed of general changes in prices 
of consumer goods represent in brief changes in 
prices of different groups and kinds of goods. That 
is why comparison of the process of changing 
prices by groups of goods is one of main keys to 
understand the meaning of the general index. It is 
shown in table 4.
9Based on the above structure of main groups of 
consumer goods following conclusions can be 
made:
1. Growth of prices for food, drinks and catering 
constitutes the main share of growing prices for 
consumer goods.
2.  Prices for housing, power and heating as well 
as fees for services in education sector rise 
sharply every third quarter of each year, giving 
an impetus to growth of total prices, but in the 
end of the year a wave of falling price cycle 
emerges. 
3. A fact that an intensive growth of almost all 
kinds of goods and services is observed in the 
second and third quarters every year is one of 
examples how traders take advantage of events 
and the psychological atmosphere of the society 
(holidays, vacations, election etc.)
4. Regulation that maintained price growth within 
a one digit figure was lost in the most kinds 
goods and services in the third quarter of 2007, 
reaching 12.6% in the end of the quarter and 
15.1% in the end of the year, which was a 
reliable sign of unhealthy economy. 
5. Growth of prices for goods and services soared 
in 2008, increasing by 40.5% in the end of the 
year against 2006, which made a strong impact 
on the market balance, wealth distribution, 
consumption structure and dealt a strong blow 
on living standards of population. When growth 
of prices in 2006-2009 is examined by groups, 
it grew by :
• 68.2% - Education services
• 58.7% - Food and drinks  
• 50.7% - Hotels and catering 
• 39.3% - Medicines 
• 37.6% - Housing, power, heating 
• 20.4% - Clothing and shoes
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3.2. Currency rate 
Since a great part of consumer goods in our 
country is imported, the consumer prices are 
closely connected with the foreign trade prices. 
Based on this, there is a need for the currency rate 
Time
US dollar Yuan
Rate
Seasonal 
fluctuations%
Rate 
Seasonal 
fluctuations  %
1 2 3 4 5
End of 2006 1165.00 - 149.10 -
2007 I quarter
II quarter
III quarter
IV quarter
1165.00
1163.85
1184.26
1169.97
0
-0.10
+1.75
-1.21
150.80
150.80
157.61
160.18
+1.14
0
+4.50
+1.63
2008 I quarter
II quarter
III quarter
IV quarter
1168.17
1158.12
1146.09
1267.51
-0.02
-0.86
-1.04
+10.56
166.58
168.78
167.43
185.25
+4.00
+1.32
-0.80
+10.64
2009 I quarter
II quarter
1524.07
1435.49
+20.04
-5.84
222.95
210.08
+20.35
-5.77
From the above it can be seen that the US dollar 
and yuan to tugrug rates fell substantially in the 
third quarter of 2007, then the tugrug to dollar 
rate increased in fourth quarter and until fourth 
quarter 2008 it grew by 3.2%.
However, the tugrug to yuan rate went down 
steadily. Since fourth quarter of 2008 the tugrug 
rate fell sharply and in the first quarter of 2009 it 
reached its peak, compared to 2006 it grew by:
• US dollar 31.6%
• Yuan 50.0%.
to become an important tool of macro-economic 
regulation.
Table 5 shows changes in currency rates of two 
main currencies affecting the market balance in 
the last quarters since 2006.
Table 5
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Since second quarter of 2009 until present the 
above currency rate is basically stable. If the 
tugrug to dollar and yuan rate fluctuations are 
matched up to changes in consumer goods prices, 
interesting dynamics are observed, which is shown 
in table 6. 
Index against 2006 
Percentage matched to 
changes in prices
Consumer 
goods prices
US dollar 
rate
Yuan rate
US dollar 
rate 
Yuan rate 
1 2 3 4 5 6
End of 2006 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
2007 I quarter
II quarter
III quarter
IV quarter
1.022
1.064
1.126
1.151
1.000
0.999
1.018
1.004
1.011
1.011
1.057
1.074
0.000
-0.016
0.143
0.026
0.500
0.172
0.452
0.490
2008 I quarter
II quarter
III quarter
IV quarter
1.247
1.376
1.434
1.405
1.003
0.994
0.984
1.087
1.117
1.132
1.122
1.242
0.012
-0.002
-0.004
0.215
0.473
0.351
0.281
0.597
2009 I quarter
II quarter
1.450
1.385
1.308
1.232
1.495
1.409
0.684
0.602
1.100
1.062
Following conclusions can be made from the 
above:
1.  The tugrug to US dollar rate was completely 
free of the internal inflation up to the fourth 
quarter of 2008 and in some cases was subject 
to the contrary movement, which shows that 
the Mongol Bank not only lacked sensitivity 
for macroeconomic regulation, but also did not 
follow a policy of securing national interests. 
Table 6
2.  The tugrug to yuan rate has had a strong 
positive correlation with inflation. In the first 
half of 2009 the tugrug to yuan rate exceeded 
the price growth and fell. It may cause the 
traders to inflate domestic prices even further. 
In 2007 and the second quarter of 2008 a trend 
was observed of the yuan rate lagging behind 
price growth, which is related to an increasing 
access to yuan because of supply of cashmere 
in this period. 
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3.  The dollar and Yuan rates have grown 
sharply since the fourth quarter of 2008. 
Artificially maintaining a stable dollar rate, 
when consumer prices were growing and then 
creating a sharp shock after the currency 
reserve, which reached 1019 million US dollars 
in the end of 2006 declined almost twice, 
represented a distortion of the monetary policy 
and became one of reasons for kneeling before 
the crisis. 
4.  For our country, that sells its main export 
products in US dollars, the hard US dollar 
rate maintained in 2007 and 2008 reduced the 
domestic industry income by 162 billion tugrugs 
and 934 billion tugrugs respectively and led to 
loss of budget income. It became one of causes 
for decline and recession.
3.3. Salaries, wages, pensions and benefits
Budget salaries, social insurance, social insurance 
pensions and benefits have risen sharply in the last 
Indicators
II quarter 
of 2006  
II quarter 
of 2007  
II quarter 
of 2008   
II quarter 
of 2009   
1 2 3 4 5
1. Budget salaries and wages 100.0 132.4 278.5 311.0
1. Social insurance pension 100.0 148.5 228.3 232.2
1. Social welfare pensions and benefits 100.0 211.3 257.9 270.6
This dramatic growth of salaries, pensions and 
benefits could not leave basic macroeconomic 
balance as well as currency rates and price growth 
unaffected. By the second quarter of 2009 the 
average monthly salary at national level equaled 
309.2 thousand MNT. When the salary levels are 
examined by professional categories, one can see 
they are directed to support civil servants.
Table 7                                                                              II quarter of 2006 =100
three years (Table 7).
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Of total growth of budget salaries in the last three 
years 15% is in the second to fourth quarters of 
2007, 69% - in the second to fourth quarters, 16% 
- in the second quarter of 2009. If the structure of 
social insurance pension growth is studied, 36.6% 
of it took place in the second quarter of 2007, 
60.5% - in 2008, 2.9% - in 2009. This situation 
illustrates how the state policy drove up inflation. 
Table 8                                                                         National average salary = 1.00
Men Women
1 Law-maker, civil servant 1.730 1.370
2 Specialist 1.334 1.157
3 Technical staff 1.217 0.965
4 Assistant clerical staff 0.971 0.792
5 Service staff 0.932 0.732
6  Agriculture, fishery, hunting 0.938 0.780
7 Industry and sales workers 0.944 0.733
8 Machinery and equipment operator, assembly line worker 1.122 0.925
9 Common specialist 0.668 0.651
There is sufficient evidence to view that growth of 
salaries, pensions and benefits, which passed far 
ahead of the domestic industry growth, not only 
drove up price growth, but also affected increase 
in the import load, disruption of the foreign trade 
balance, depletion of hard currency reserves 
(Table 9).
Table 9
Indicators
II quarter of 2009 Index compared to growth of 
budget salaries and wagesII quarter of 2006
1 2 3
Budget salaries and wages 3.11 1.000
1 Industrial produce (adjacent prices) 2.002 0.61
2 Construction works (prices of the year) 1.445 0.465
3 Reared young livestock 1.367 0.439
4 Sown area 1.796 0.577
5 Import 1.445 0.464
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According to the statistical data, while in the first 
half of 2006 sale of industrial produce (prices of 
the year) equaled 889.7 billion MNT, in 2007 it 
rose by 27.2%, in 2008- by 28.7%, but in the first 
half of 2009 it fell by 23.8%. It is well-known that 
growth of sales income in the two previous years 
was related to growing export prices for precious 
and non-ferrous metals. In this way measures 
taken by the state in the last there years on 
increasing salaries, pensions and benefits were not 
secured by material wealth, so there are grounds 
to view that in this aspect they affected the 
macroeconomic crisis.
3.4. Money, loans
It can be viewed that crisis in the dynamics of our 
economy in the last three years in many aspects is 
Total money M2 Ì1
Of it
Money outside 
banks 
Current account 
balance 
1. Billion MNT
2006 îí IV quarter 1536.5 331.9 185.1 146.7
2007 II quarter 2016.1 502.2 262.4 239.8
              IV quarter 2401.9 590.5 283.3 307.1
2008 II quarter 2564.7 628.9 307.8 317.1
              IV quarter 2270.0 647.3 328.7 318.6
2009 II quarter 2424.6 534.3 283.8 250.5
2. 2006 = 100%, 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
2007 II quarter 136.1 151.2 141.6 163.7
              IV quarter 156.3 178.2 152.9 2.102
2008 II quarter 166.9 189.7 165.9 2.170
              IV quarter 147.8 195.5 177.3 2.178
2007 II quarter 157.8 161.3 152.9 1.710
Table 10
connected with money supply and a policy on its 
structure. Table 10 illustrates it.
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It shows that in the last three years money supply 
has been fluctuating abruptly, so 63.3% of money 
growth in 2006 - 2009 took place in the second 
term of 2007 with 83.5% of M1 growth and 89.7% 
of current account balance growth in the same 
quarter. 
Since third quarter of 2008 the monetary policy 
of the Central Bank has changed abruptly and in 
the second quarter of 2009 compared to the same 
period of 2008, total money, M1, money outside 
banks, current accounts balance in MNT fell 
down by 5.5%, 15.1%, 8.1% and 21.1% respectively. 
In the same period quasi-money (time savings 
+ currency savings) decreased by 2.5%, basically 
remaining at the same level.
Following statistics show that such a monetary 
supply policy conflicts with the objective economic 
needs (Table 11).
It shows that in 2007 money supply bypassed GDP 
turnover, reducing the speed of money turnover 
by 21.5% and since the end of 2008 an abrupt 
policy of folding up money was introduced, thus 
increasing the turnover demand by  42% and 
lodging the economy in a jam. 
Table 11                                                                                                  (billion MNT)
2006 2007 2008 2009
1 2 3 4 5
1 GDP by prices of the year 3714.9 4557.5 6130.3 7050*
2 Total money - M
2
1536.5 2401.9 2270 2424.6
3  Number of money turnover 2.42 1.90 2.70 2.91
4 Growth of budget salaries 2006 = 100 100.0 132.4 278.5 311.0
5 Growth of money outside banks 2006 = 100 100.0 152.9 177.3 152.9
6 Ratio of Growth of money outside banks to Growth 
of budget salaries 
1.000 1.155 0.638 0.492
     * Author’s calculations
Furthermore, supply of Money outside banks, 
which was ahead of growth of budget salaries by 
15.5% in 2007, lagged behind by 36.2% in the 
end of 2008, and by 51.8% in the first half of 
2009, which is related to ever-declining income of 
especially rural population, but in total becomes a 
prerequisite of deflation. 
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Of total money in our country 2/3 are quasi-
money. Substantial changes took place in the 
dynamics and purchasing power of quasi-money in 
the last three years. (Table 12)
While in the end of 2006 total currency reserves 
reached 1019 million US dollars, in the beginning 
of 2009 they went down to 500 million dollars, 
which weakened greatly the ability of quasi-money 
Table 12
Quasi money 
(billion MNT)
2006 = 100
US dollar rate 
(tug)
Quasi money 
million (US 
dollar)
2006 = 100
1 2 3 4 5 6
2006 1204.6 100.0 1165 1033.4 100.0
2007 II quarter 1513.9 125.6 1164 1299.8 125.7
          IV quarter 1810.8 150.3 1170 1547.2 149.5
2008 II quarter 1939.8 161.0 1158 1674.4 162.1
          IV quarter 1622.7 134.7 1267 1280.1 123.9
2009 II quarter 1890.3 156.9 1435 1317.1 127.5
to service the economic demand as we mentioned 
previously. 
As the previous table 12 shows, growth of quasi-
money has been quite different from the GDP 
dynamics (Table 13).
Table 13
GDP (price of the year 
billion MNT)
2006 = 100
Quasi money 
(billion MNT)
2006 = 100
2006 3714 100.0 1204.9 100.0
2007 II quarter - - 1513.9 125.7
         IV quarter 4557 122.7 1810.8 150.3
2008 II quarter - - 1939.8 161.5
         IV quarter 6130 165.1 1622.7 134.7
2009 II quarter - - 1890.4 157.5
         IV quarter 7050* 189.8* 2000.0* 166.1
     * Author’s projection
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In the past years since mid-2007 growth of quasi-
money increased twice faster than GDP turnover, 
but since the end of 2008 it lagged behind it. It 
illustrates that the state monetary policy is short-
sighted and is not researched thoroughly. 
The bank loans and loan interest policy had the 
hardest situation in the last there years. Table 14 
shows dynamics of total loans outstanding and 
their structure.
Following peculiarities can be observed from the 
above:
1. In the last 3 years the loans outstanding have 
exceeded the GDP growth, however, since the 
beginning of 2007 to the end of the first half 
of 2008 in the course of one year and half it 
increased 2.1 times against the first balance 
of 2007. It proves that the loan policy was too 
weak. 
 It is well known that the main cause of 
this loan “mania” was the year of “great 
Total loans outstanding Past due loans Non-performing loans
Billion 
MNT
2006 = 100
Billion 
MNT
2006 = 100
Billion 
MNT
2006 = 100
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2006 1223.3 100.0 33.3 100.0 60.0 100.0
2007 II quarter 1600.2 130.8 44.7 134.2 61.9 103.2
         IV quarter 2056.1 168.1 40.3 121.0 68.1 113.5
2008 II quarter 2559.4 209.2 54.6 164.0 73.0 121.7
         IV quarter 2635.6 215.4 93.3 280.2 188.7 314.5
2009 II quarter 2558.9 209.2 152.1 456.8 298.0 496.7
Table 14
development” announced by the government of 
Mongolia in 2007-2008, which led to inflation 
of prices for housing by the chain of foreign 
and domestic construction companies and 
artificial expansion of construction industry 
regardless of lack of construction materials 
and technical capacity as well as shortage of 
qualified workers. 
2. The volume of past due, non-performing loans 
increased steadily, soaring in the last half 
of 2008. This was related to the quality and 
justification of previous loans. Therefore, short-
18
sighted banks became alarmed only in the 4th 
quarter of 2008, which was too late.  
 Non-performing and past due loans or bad 
loans reached 17.5% of total loans in the first 
half of 2009 and their number is continuing to 
grow. By the first half of 2009, the construction 
sector accounted for 21.1% of total loans 
outstanding. At present (second quarter) bad 
loans reached 96.6% of total bank reserves. This 
situation shows that the economic recession in 
our country is not only continuing, but signals 
that there is a stronger blow to come. 
3. In present conditions, when the loans 
outstanding are not decreasing and the quality 
of loans is weakening along with strong 
economic decline, the government savings of 
540.7 billion  MNT allocated in banks reached 
15.0% of total bank liabilities and became a 
main source of support for banks. However, 
this mechanism cannot last for long. The time 
will come, when the state loan policy supports 
the economic overhaul and through will direct 
banks towards cure.
4. In the fourth quarter of 2008, when the 
economic crisis was at its highest point, the 
Mongol Bank increased its policy interest to 
52% and although it reduced the interest rate 
in July and September, the interest rate is still 
21% higher compared to that of mid-2008. This 
policy blocked the loan turnover and strangled 
the economy. It can be seen from the loan flow 
in the last one year (Table 16). 
Table 16 (billion MNT)
Loans outstanding 2009.VI
2008.VI 2009.VI 2008. VI
Total 2559.4 2558.9 0.997
Of it:        Golomt 419.1 435.8 1.033
                Capital 48.8 53.6 1.098
                 KHAAN 588.5 562.9 0.956
                 TDB 453.3 416.0 0.918
                 Mongol Post 179.2 140.7 0.785
                 Savings 51.5 52.1 1.009
                 Transport and development 8.8 9.1 1.034
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A fact that the banking sector got into such a 
difficult, stagnant state will deepen further losses 
and increase risks. In 2008 the Parliament made 
a decision to secure individual savings by the 
state. It is not a savings insurance. If banks face 
bankruptcy as the Anod bank, the state will not be 
able to bear the savings risks. 
                  Erel 9.5 8.7 0.915
                  Credit 4.5 4.6 1.022
                  Ulaanbaatar 122.4 125.9 1.028
                  Zoos 167.4 191.8 1.145
                  Anod 179.2 170.9 0.954
                  Capitron 84.4 90.9 1.087
                  Khas 136.5 162.2 1.197
                  Chinghis Khaan 86.7 107.9 1.259
Table 16 (cont.) 
Individual savings account for 34.2% of total loans 
outstanding in banks. It equals to 27-30% of their 
annual cash income. However, while banks pay 
0.4-1% for deposits and 0.2-1.5% for time deposits, 
their loan interests is 1-4%.
It can be seen that in present conditions banks 
survive by lending money to the public rather than 
serving the real economy with turnover of money.
3.5. Foreign trade, prices
The present economic recession in Mongolia stems 
from the global financial and economic crisis 
and there is a widespread understanding in the 
society that with stabilization and growth of prices 
for copper, gold, raw materials, the crisis in our 
country will go away.
A look at the 2003-2009 foreign trade turnover 
statistics shows that it is necessary to address the 
above problem carefully (Table 17).
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Following conclusions can be made based on these 
statistics:
1. Until the end of 2008 the global economic 
situation did not affect significantly the export 
income of our country. If in the first half 
of 2008 the export income rose by 52.6 % 
compared to the same period of 2007, in the 
last half it grew by 20.0%.
2. The foreign trade balance that was stable 
in 2006 and the first half of 2007 fell down 
sharply since the last half of 2007. The volume 
of import increased by 43.8 % in the last half 
Table 17 
Transactions in the first half of the year
2007 2008 
2006 2007 2008 2009 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 Export
- mil US dollar 611.6 836.2 1276.3 762.9 1889.0 2539.3
- 2006  = 100 100.0 136.7 208.7 124.7 - -
2. Import
- mil US dollar 617.2 868.4 1695.0 892.8 2117.3 3615.8
- 2006 = 100 100.0 140.7 274.6 144.6 - -
3. Foreign trade balance
- mil US dollar -5.6 -31.8 -418.7 -129.9 -228.3 -1076.5
- 2006 = 100 100.0 567.9 75 times 23 times - -
In export, by % -0.9 -3.8 -32.8 -17.0 -12.1 -42.3
of 2007 compared to the first half of the same 
year and in the first half of 2008 it rose by 
95.2%. It showed an import mania caused by 
the “great development” policy. The foreign 
trade balance losses increased 5.7 times in 
2007, 75 times in 2008 and 23 times in 2009 
compared to the first half of 2006.
3. The global economic crisis affected our country 
significantly since 2009. It was related to strong 
fluctuations of prices for basic metals at the 
global market and reduced demand for them 
(Table 18).
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 The sales price for gold did not fall, but prices 
for copper and zinc concentrate decreased 
twice. It definitely affected decline of export 
income. 
4. It is widely understood that sharp rise of petrol 
prices at the global market in 2008 caused great 
Table 18
Price per 1 ton /US dollar 2007  = 100
2007 2008 2009 2008 2009 
1 2 3 4 5 6
Gold (1 ton = mil $) 20.25 27.1 27.3 133.8 134.8
Copper concentrate 1235.1 1433.5 654.2 107.3 49.00
Zinc concentrate 1326.1 1128.5 676.3 85.1 51.0
problems in our economy. This understanding 
should be treated cautiously. The dynamics of 
petrol and diesel fuel prices in 2007 – 2009 is 
shown in table 19.
 Although the price of fuel rose by 43.1- 56.4% 
in 2008 against the previous year, it was by 
15.3-26.9% cheaper in the first half of 2009 
against 2007 and by 45.7- 49.0% lower against 
2008. 
 In 2008, when prices for main export products 
of our country grew sharply, growth of fuel 
Table 19
Price per ton/US dollars 2007 = 100
2007 2008 2009 2008 2009
1 2 3 4 5 6
1. Petrol for vehicles 690.7 988.3 504.8 143.1 73.1
2. Diesel fuel 698.2 1092.5 592.8 156.4 84.7
prices was not a cause for crisis, but only an 
issue of domestic regulation. In 2009 prices 
for some export products went down and the 
fuel price also went down. This is not a cause 
for recession that becomes chronic. If the first 
half of 2009 is compared to the same period 
of 2008, our economy lost 225.9 million US 
dollars due to fall of copper prices, but gained 
22
154.5 million USD from  decreasing fuel prices. 
The gap of 71.4 million dollars equals 9.4% of 
export income, which is a possible fluctuation 
in normal conditions.  
1. Sharp rise in fuel prices in 2008 increased the 
petrol import of our country by 6% and that of 
diesel fuel by 10.8%, this year, when the prices 
fell, petrol and diesel fuel were imported less by 
23% and 14.2% respectively, which is related to 
implementation of the state policy on increasing 
national reserves at the peak of growing prices 
for petrol last year. 
 If the dynamics of the first half of 2009 
continue throughout the year, all economic 
sectors except for agriculture (livestock breeding 
and crop cultivation) are heading towards 
decline by 7.2-38.2%.  Export declined by 30%. 
Although decline in foreign currency reserves 
might be compensated by reduction of import, 
it will, in return, be connected to domestic 
market, production and consumption decline. 
 Along with this further worsening of banking 
and finance situation each quarter causes even 
more difficulties for a possibility of economic 
recovery. 
 In the first seven months of 2009 the export 
income decreased by 539.9 million US dollars 
compared to the same period of the last year. 
Of it price reduction accounts for 85.7% 
or 462.5 million US dollars, and reduced 
production of goods accounts for 14.3% or 77.4 
million US dollars. Among products, which 
prices went down, the copper concentrate takes 
a special place and in the first 7 months 335.3 
thousand tons of concentrate were sold at 683 
US dollars per ton, so income was by 291.7 
million dollars less against the last year. 
 In the above period purified copper and copper 
alloy were sold at the average price of 4020 
dollars per ton. Even if copper prices reach 
6000 dollars in the last half of the year, it will 
not compensate 2/3 of the above mentioned 
loss. It is almost certain that loss of 150 million 
dollars due to declining prices for molybdenum, 
zinc and petrol will not be compensated. 
23
3.6. Some production dynamics
Since 2006 the national domestic product of 
Mongolia has increased by 8.6-9.9% annually. 
According to the NSO calculations, in 2009 it is 
to reduce by 1.3%. The NSO based its calculations 
on the hard prices of 2005. If decline of income in 
hard currency due to prices of export products is 
taken into account, NDP in 2009 will decline by 
11.1-13.0% of the real volume of the last year. 
By the first half of 2009 main industrial sectors 
have following dynamics (Table 20).
Table 20
First half 2007, II = 100 2009
20082007 2008 2009 2008 2009 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 Industrial output (2005 prices)- 
billion MNT
770.5 799.9 742.9 103.8 96.4 92.8
2 Construction (prices of the year)- 
billion MNT
68.4 108.2 66.9 158.1 97.8 61.8
3 Reared young livestock (million 
heads)
11.9 12.1 13.6 101.7 114.3 112.4
4 Sown area (thou.hectares) 195.8 190.3 280.3 97.2 143.1 147.3
5 Wholesale (mil. MNT) 165.5 319.2 273.1 192.9 165.5 85.5
6 Retail trade (mil. MNT) 156.4 254.9 181.1 162.9 115.7 71.2
7 Export (mil. US dollars) 836.2 1276.3 892.8 152.6 106.8 70.0
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Such institutions as our NDIC made a conclusion 
that since July 2009 the economic crisis went away 
and the recovery began.
If we look at the NSO data on the third quarter of 
2009, following dynamics are observed against last 
year ( Table 21).
4. THIRD QUARTER OF 2009
Indicators
Changes in percent (%)
2009 I – III
2008 I – III
2009 III
2008 III
1 2 3
1. Consumer price index -0.1 -2.7
2. Budget salaries and wages +9.4 +4.1
3. Pensions and benefits +2.1 2.1
4. Labor productivity in industry -5.5 -9.7
5. State budget income -17.8 -13.8
6. State budget expenditure
                    Of it: current expenses
+2.6
+2.8
-1.4
+3.3
7. Total money +5.1 +5.1
8. Total loans
             Of it: non-performing loans
-3.2
5.29 äàõèí
-54.3
47.5 äàõèí
9. Export -33.9 -22.2
10. Import -38.8 -19.0
11. Industrial output (2005 prices) -10.6 -16.3
12. Construction works -31.5 -24.6
13. Harvested crops +59.9 +59.9
14. Harvested vegetables +28.6 +28.6
Table 21
25
This statistics show that it is too early to make a 
conclusion that the national economic crisis ended 
and recovery started, and risks of facing chronic 
problems are increasing even more. There are 
objective grounds for such caution:
1. Production in all sectors except agriculture has 
not grown, but declined against the last year. 
By the first 9 months results the industrial 
output was 10.6% less against the previous 
year and in the third quarter there was a 
16.3% decline. Labor productivity in industry 
decreased by 5.5% in the first 9 months with 
9.7% decline in the third quarter. 
2. The volume of export and import is 33.9-38.8% 
less compared to the level of first nine months 
of the last year. 
3. The state budget income declined by 17.8% in 
the first nine months with 13.8%  reduction 
in the first quarter,  while the current budget 
expenditure increased by 2.8% in the first nine 
months and by 3.3% in the third quarter.
4. The amount of total money grew up by 5.1%, 
of it money from outside banks- by 0.7%. 
In the above period the budget salaries and 
pensions and benefits rose by 9.4 and 2.1% 
respectively, so the above figure of money 
supply represents continuing consumer market 
crisis. 
5. The bank loan turnover has slowed down 
perceptively and the situation in this sphere has 
become quite problematic. 
If the first 3 quarters of 2009 are compared 
to those of the last year the loans outstanding 
declined by 4.2% and in the third quarter growth 
of loans outstanding declined by 54.3%. However, 
the non-performing loans outstanding grew 5.29 
times in the first 9 months and in the third 
quarter they grew 47.5 times. Problems that have 
accumulated in the banking sector are illustrated 
in the following Table 22.  
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The crisis faced by the banking sector is 
represented by the following symptoms.
1. While the share of equity in total bank 
liabilities equaled 14% in the third quarter 
of 2008, it declined to 6.5 in third quarter of 
2009 and the total  money went down by 47.1% 
in the same period. The situation in banking 
became unstable. 
Table 22
2008 2009
June
Septem-
ber
June
Septem-
ber
June
Septem-
ber
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1. Total bank assets (liabilities)- billion 
MNT. Of it:
- Central Bank securities
- Bank reserves
- Equity
3281.3
63.3
198.4
426.6
3427.4
41.1
229.6
479.8
3603.7
143.9
466.0
323.4
3814.7
356.7
376.6
249.8
109.8
227.3
235.3
75.8
111.3
867.9
164.0
52.1
2. Total assets (liabilities)=100
- Central Bank securities
- Bank reserves
- Equity
100.0
0.19
6.0
13.0
100.0
1.2
6.7
14.0
100.0
4.0
12.9
8.98
100.0
9.3
9.8
6.5
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
3. Total loans outstanding – billion 
MNT
- Past due
- Non-performing
2559.4
54.6
73.1
2716.8
54.8
75.1
2558.9
152.1
297.9
2630.9
198.2
397.7
99.98
278.5
407.5
96.8
361.7
529.6
4. Total loans = 100 
Of it
- Past due
- Non-performing
100.0
2.1
2.8
100.0
2.0
2.8
100.0
5.9
11.6
100.0
7.5
15.1
-
-
-
-
-
-
2009 
2008 
- %
2. While the Central bank securities in total bank 
assets accounted for 1.2% in the third quarter 
of 2008, in the third quarter of 2009 it grew 
to 9.8%. Independence and free opportunities 
for activities of commercial banks has become 
limited. 
3. In one year the bank reserves increased 2.3 
times and its share in total assets increased 2.2 
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times. It illustrates weakening money turnover 
and expectations of risks. 
4. The volume of total loans reduced by 3.2% 
compared to the third quarter of 2008, but 
the past due loans and non-performing loans 
increased 3.6 and 5.3 times respectively. While 
in the end of the third quarter of 2008 past 
due loans accounted for 2.0% of total loans, 
at present it grew to 7.5%, non-performing 
loans increased from 2.8 to 15.1% and bad 
loans account for 22.6% of total loans. When 
the third quarter of 2009 is compared to 
the second quarter, past due loans and non 
performing loans grew by 30.3 and 33.5% 
respectively. 
To sum up, the banking sector came to the brink 
of an acute crisis and it cannot avoid it without 
a very strong support from the government. It is 
time for the government to pay attention to the 
fact that a catastrophe in the banking sector will 
lead to a strong economic as well as social crisis. 
For the first time in its history Mongolia faced 
a crisis of the market economic system and 
was swept by the wave of global financial crisis. 
Politicians, economists and businessman do not 
agree on the ways to getting out of crisis and its 
consequences. 
As the above study of economic statistics in 
our country shows, the economic crisis faced at 
present is a sum of two consequent crises and 
contains double blows. For instance:
1. Since mid-2007 due to mistaken, weak policy 
of our government the crisis of domestic 
“manufacture” started and reached its peak 
in the middle of 2008. This is proved by 
rising inflation and loss of macro-economic 
5. CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS FROM THE LAST THREE YEARS
balance since mid 2007 and problems with 
the monetary and loan policies in 2008. At 
that time the government announced “Great 
development”, conducted a universal, “soft” 
social policy and misused favorable conditions 
at the global market.
2. At the time, when the crisis of “manufacture” 
caused by internal sectors reached its peak with 
inflation exceeding 34% and the foreign trade 
deficit of 23.9% with loss of budget balance, 
the global financial and economic crisis took 
place and dealt a knock-out blow. 
At present our country needs to resolve the 
problem of whether the above double crisis in 
economy will lead to failure of the banking sector. 
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Since the start of crisis in the period of over one 
year or until the end of 2008 public institutions did 
not take any measures to improve the economic 
policy, but, on the contrary, supported ineffective 
investment, thus strengthening the tugrik rate, 
and put forward nice development slogans. Even 
in the fourth quarter of 2008, when the global 
economic crisis started, the state approved a 
budget with enormous loss and there was even 
talk about opportunities to gain from crisis. In the 
last quarter of 2008, when the situation became 
hopeless, the government and the parliament made 
a decision to secure savings of the general public 
(in reality they remained without any guarantee) 
and the Mongol bank   increased sharply its policy 
interests. No other measures were taken. 
In the beginning of 2009 the government 
presented a plan to overcome crisis for approval 
by the parliament. The core of the plan is to take 
a loan equal to 1500 billion MNT from foreign 
countries to support national economy. The 
government did not realize that the Mongolian 
economy has a united, interrelated system, 
although it is small-scale and open. At present the 
loan of 1500 million dollars is not secured and 
the only hope is on some loans from the IFM and 
donors to sustain the economy. Although a fall 
in consumer prices observed in the last months 
is promoted as a proof of getting out of crisis, 
it looks more like deflation caused by spreading 
crisis. While in the third quarter of this year 
retails prices declined by 28.8%, wholesale- by 
30%and import- by 38.8% compared to the same 
quarter of the last year, decreasing prices can only 
present deflation. 
The greatest impact of the global financial and 
economic crisis on the economy of our country is 
falling demand for minerals at the global market 
and declining prices for them. This is a common 
destiny for economies based on raw materials, 
following the direction of mining. In other words, 
it is the consequence of Dutch disease that has 
already affected our economy. 
The present economic crisis that greatly harmed 
the future of our country as well as the lives of the 
people taught severe lessons to the Mongolian state 
policy:
1. If the economic policy, its directions and 
methods adopted by the Mongolian state 
(Parliament, GoM) does not reach the level 
of modern global insight and atmosphere, 
the economy of our country cannot become 
healthy. Since 2000 the political parties, 
fighting for power and authority, have made 
promises that exceed the capacity of our 
national economy and in 2008 elections the 
economy was used at the level of a political 
pawn, a scapegoat. Since mid-2007 the highest 
state institutions followed populist policies 
directed towards 2008 parliament and local 
elections. They confused the starting positive 
market cycle with a sustainable trend, which 
started the “manufacture” crisis. 
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In the conditions of deepening economic recession 
along with reverberation of the global economic 
crisis the present parliament and the government 
proved their inability to conduct a sound policy. 
The banking, financial and monetary policies 
failed and at least 500 billion from taxpayers 
money and loans from abroad that the next 
generation will have to pay back is needed for 
economic recovery. 
At each level of a state institution professionals 
capable to perform their duties should work. 
However, the economic policy planned and 
implemented by the present parliament and 
government is at the level of the “small traders 
concept”, which should be changed.
2. The present state system itself limits 
opportunities for implementation of a proper, 
justified, controlled economic policy.  Since 
2000, when candidates to the parliament 
started competing with each other with their 
wealth in the course of election, making any 
promises that their mouths could utter in 
order to become parliament members and then 
becoming ministers without any idea about the 
state policy, a conflict of interests between the 
state policy and business became obvious and 
it became “a performance of volunteer actors” 
by non-professional ministers. The policy of 
“great development” announced in 2007 and 
continued in 2008 also was of the same nature. 
As a result, 1/3 of total money to service the 
national economy is blocked in unfinished 
housing construction. The attempt to secure 
aid and loans from foreign countries in 2009 
was of the same nature. 
 The monetary and loan policy of the Mongol 
bank up to the present was also of the same 
nature. It is time to clarify responsibilities of 
the parliament and the government. 
3. A fact that a state policy based on politics and 
business union leads to bankruptcy  became 
obvious during this crisis. That this connection 
is one of the main root causes of problems 
faced by the banks becomes more obvious 
everyday. While in rural areas prices for 
livestock and raw materials have fallen down 
sharply and herders’ livelihoods have declined, 
this summer in urban areas prices for meat 
rose sharply, which represented one of harmful 
consequences of this connection. Although 
prices for fuel, energy that affect basic prices of 
the market economy have grown year by year, 
becoming a heavy load for the economy, the 
government did not take any proper measures 
to overcome this. Everyone knows that many 
mining companies conduct their activities 
without any control from the state causing 
irreparable damage to the economy and 
environment. 
 The state budget planning and implementation 
in the last 3 years clearly showed that a state 
policy based on the union of politics and 
business is not able to save money or effectively 
spend it. 
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 Although many years ago professionals started 
warning that behind each article of the budget 
expenditure there was an interest of a certain 
business group and the national economy has 
become a “distribution economy” looking 
for the budget, the state did not listen to 
them. At the present time of economic crisis 
and historic challenge a need to increase the 
sensitivity of state policy has become urgent.
4. A lesson that an economy with a one-sided 
structure, based on raw materials becomes a 
pawn of market conditions even in conditions 
of a market with few kinds of raw materials 
let alone a global crisis,  was taught by the 
present crisis. Attracting foreign and domestic 
investment in mining of minerals and their 
export in order to follow further extensive 
economic growth policy will inevitably make 
the economy even more vulnerable.  
5. Another lesson learned from crisis is that the 
state should have different policy options for 
overcoming various directions of economic 
crisis, as well as assets and resources. If 
income derived from the growth of raw 
materials export in 2006-2008 was properly 
accumulated and utilized, there was an 
opportunity to overcome the present crisis 
easily. However, it was spent ineffectively on 
the initiative of the highest state institutions, 
which became an impetus for the crisis. It is 
time to stop a possibility of repeating such a 
mistake. 
6. Incomprehensive macroeconomic, financial, 
monetary and loan policies, lack of links 
between them augments the strength of crisis 
and makes it chronic. This chaotic situation 
caused the start of the present crisis and makes 
its end more difficult. Although in the frame 
of the parliament such coordination of the 
state policy should be made, the course of 
2008-2009 session clearly showed lack of the 
structure to meet this need and inability of 
Standing committees to coordinate and focus 
their activities.
 Instead of formulating the policy at the level 
of the highest state institution the parliament 
has become a place of trade-off for political 
parties, results of which are forced to be 
accepted by the society, which was revealed in 
the course of discussing all problems related to 
the present crisis. It is time for the Mongolian 
state to implement a unified economic policy.
7. Increasing the capacity of banks to carry 
the load at the time of economic crisis with 
a wide frame, supporting conditions for 
proper activities has become a focus of the 
state policy that does not exist at present. 
At the start of the present crisis, the state 
promised to guarantee savings of population, 
31
which calmed the people, but it was a false, 
misleading promise. It might lead the banks to 
taking wrong steps and furthermore, the state 
compensates the loss caused by irresponsible 
activities with money of taxpayers and provides 
loan-takers, who caused the bank bankruptcy,  
with an opportunity to take an advantage of 
it. The bank immunity should be implemented 
in a relation to the savings insurance. It is 
a time to realize that a strong state control 
is necessary to provide security of bank 
transactions. 
8. Herders are a social group that were hit the 
hardest by the present crisis. Their income fell, 
while consumer prices have increased. The 
state policy concerning herders at that time 
was directed towards support of their wealthiest 
part. Furthermore, support of only the goat-
breeding led the livestock to even more 
vulnerable state. There is lack of a unified 
system with regular operations to protect 
herders’ livelihood from market fluctuations 
and sudden climatic changes and to ensure the 
sustainability of livestock breeding. Without 
resolving that problem the national economy 
cannot be stabilized. 
9. One of the main causes of the present 
economic crisis in our country was fluctuations 
in prices for petrol at the global market. 
There is lack of the state policy to provide the 
country with its own fuel. The present petrol 
importers will not support such a policy and 
will not be able to implement it. 
 The above few lessons cannot cover the whole 
frame of the crisis. However, I hope that it 
might be helpful for the first steps in this 
direction.
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